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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the Electrical Power Generation/Fuel
Cell Powerplant Subsystem
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GEE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986. The IOA
approach features--a-top-down" analysis of the hardware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter
Electrical Power Generation (EPG)/Fuel Cell Powerplant (FCP)
hardware.
The EPG/FCP hardware is required for performing functions of
electrical power generation and product water distribution in the
Orbiter. Specifically, the EPG/FCP hardware consists of the
following divisions:
o Power Section Assembly (PSA)
o Reactant Control Subsystem (RCS)
o Thermal Control Subsystem (TCS)
o Water Removal Subsystem (WRS)
The IOA analysis process utilized available EPG/FCP hardware drawings
and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and
hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and
analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was
assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure
mode.
Figure 1 presents the failure criticalities for the four major
divisions of the two FCP assemblies. A summary of the number of
failure modes, by criticality, is also presented below with
Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F) criticality
second.
Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
Criticality:
Number
i/i
3
2/IR
26
2/2 3/IR
i0
3/2R
4
3/3
19
TOTAL
62
1
EPG/FCP OVERVIEW
ANALYSIS SUMMARY
I
EPGIFCP ANALYSIS SUMMARY
CRIT #FM #PCI CRIT #FM #PCI
111 3 3 312R 4 3
211R 26 26 313 19 NA
3/1R 10 0
POWER
SECTION /
POWER SECTION
ASSEMBLY
CRIT #FM #PCI
111 2 2
2/1R 5 5
3/3 1 NA
ASSESSORY SECTIOH__.
REACTANT CONTROL
SUBSYSTEM
CRIT
111
2/1R
311R
313
#FM #PCI
THERMAL CONTROL
SUBSYSTEM
CRIT #FM #PCI
211R 5 5
311R 2 0
313 4 NA
WATER REMOVAL
SUBSYSTEM
CRIT #FM #PCI
211R 9 9
311R 4 0
3/2R 4 3
3/3 9 NA
CRIT- CRITICALITY
FM - FAILURE MODE
PCI - POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEM
N A - NOT APPLICABLE
Figure 1 - EPG/FCP OVERVIEW ANALYSIS SUMMARY
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For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
Criticality:
Number
i/i
3
2/IR 2/2
26
3/IR 3/2R
3
(HWIF)
TOTAL
32
2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDACis providing an independent assessment
of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
i.I Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 EPG/FCP Ground Rules and Assumptions
The EPG/FCP ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are
defined in Appendix B.
3.0 SUBSYSTEMDESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The EPG/FCP consists of hardware that is required for electrical
power generation and Fuel Cell (FC) product water collection and
distribution in the Orbiter. Reference Figures 2 and 3. The
EPG/FCP consists of the following divisions:
i. The Power Section Assembly (PSA) which is also called
Cell Stack Assembly (CSA) combines hydrogen and oxygen
through an electrochemical conversion to produce
electrical power, water, and heat. Each PSA cell stack
consists of cell plates, pressure plates, end cell
heater/insulator plates, tie rods, and individual cell
voltage harness. Each cell plate is made up of Unitized
Electrode Assembly (UEA) and separator plates. The cell
stack consists of 96 cell plates grouped electrically
into three substacks connected in parallel. The
substack contains 32 cell plates connected electrically
in series. The PSA also contains a cell performance
monitor which provides continuous analog data outputs to
the Orbiter. The outputs transmit individual cell
performance problems or imminent failures. Reference
Figure 4.
2. The Reactant Control Subsystem (RCS) consists of
preheaters, coupled reactant regulator, hydrogen pump-
separator, condenser, hydrogen/water purge/vent line and
oxygen purge/vent line. The RCS heats cryogenic-
temperature gaseous reactants (oxygen and hydrogen) from
the Power Reactant Storage and Distribution System
(PRSDS) to an acceptable temperature for delivery to the
coupled reactant regulator. The RCS delivers reactant
gases to the PSA on demand and controls the reactant
pressure within the cell plates. The RCS provides for
purging of inert gases from reactant lines. The RCS
circulates hydrogen for water removal from the PSA and
also prevents water from entering the PSA. Reference
Figure 5.
3. The Thermal Control System (TCS) contains a coolant
pump, thermal control valve, coolant accumulator,
start/sustaining heater, and condenser. The TCS
controls the FCP operating temperatures and electrolyte
concentration. The TCS removes waste heat from the PSA
and heat from the moist hydrogen recycle flow to
condense water vapor. The TCS transfers heat to the
inlet reactant gases passing through preheaters and
rejects heat to the Orbiter vehicle cooling system.
Reference Figure 6.
4. The Water Removal Subsytem (WRS) consists of a
condenser, hydrogen pump-separator, water purity sensor,
6
water trap and water discharge line. The WRS removes
water produced in the PSA during the FCP operation. The
FCP produces water vapor which is converted to a liquid
in the condenser. The hydrogen pump-separator
centrifugally separates the water from the hydrogen.
The WRSdelivers the water to the Orbiter vehicle
potable water storage system or to the water relief
line. Reference Figure 7.
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The three EPG/FCPs are installed in the mid-body of the Orbiter
beneath the payload bay liner. Fuel Cell 1 (FCl) is located on
the left-hand side of the payload bay. Whereas, FC2 and FC3 are
located forward and aft respectively, on the right-hand side of
the payload bay. Reference Figure 8. The FCPs PSA receives
the hydrogen and oxygen reactants from the Power Reactants
Stowage and Distribution System (PRSDS). The product water from
the PSA is transported to the Environmental Control and Life
Support System (ECLSS) for stowage. The waste heat produced by
the PSA is rejected to the Orbiter vehicle cooling system through
the FC40 coolant in the TCS. The FCP receives three phase AC
electrical power from the Orbiter to power the coolant pump,
hydrogen pump-separator, and the water purity sensor. The FCP
generates DC electrical power which is distributed to the Orbiter
electrical power system. Reference Figure 9.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the hierarchy of the EPG and FCP
systems, respectively. The FCP subsystems are depicted in
Figures 4 through 7.
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4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of
the failure criticalities for each of the four major subdivisions
of the EPG/Fuel Cell. Further discussion of each of these
subdivisions and the applicable failure modes is provided in
subsequent paragraphs.
+
TABLE I Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
n_
Criticality:
PSA
RCS
TCS
WRS
TOTAL
I/I
2
1
2/1R
5
7
5
9
26
2/2 i 3/IR
- 1
- 3
- 2
- 4
- i0
3/2R
w
4
4
3/3
6
4
9
19
TOTAL
8
17
ll
26
62
--+
Of the 62 failure modes analyzed, 32 failures were determined to
be PCIs. A summary of the PCIs is presented in Table II.
Appendix D presents a cross reference between each PCI and a
specific worksheet in Appendix C.
TABLE II Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
Criticality: i/i , 2/IR , 2/2 i 3/IR 3/2R TOTAL
EPG/FPC 3 I126 - i - 3 32
4ol Analysis Results PSA
The Power Section Assembly consists of the end cell
heater/insulator plates, pressure plates, tie rods, individual
cell voltage harness, cell performance monitor, and separator
plates. These components are illustrated in Figure 4. There
16
were eight failure modes identified for this division. Of these
eight, two are criticality i/i, five are criticality 2/IR, and
one is criticality 3/IR. Seven failures from the PSA are
identified to be PCI's. These are listed in Appendix D.
4.2 Analysis Results RCS
The Reactant Control Subsystem consists of preheaters, coupled
reactant regulator, hydrogen pump spearator, condenser,
hydrogen/water purge vent line and oxygen purge/vent line. These
components are illustrated in Figure 5. There were seventeen
failure modes identified for the RCS division. Of these
seventeen, one is criticality i/i, seven are criticality
2/IR, three are criticality 3/IR, and six are criticality 3/3.
Eight failures from the RCS are identified to be PCI's. These
are listed in Appendix D.
4.3 Analysis Results TCS
The Thermal Control Subsystem contains a coolant pump, thermal
control valve, coolant accumulator, start/sustaining heater and
condenser. These components are illustrated in Figure 8. There
were eleven failure modes identified for the TCS division. Of
these eleven, five are criticality 2/IR, two are criticality
3/IR, and four are 3/3. Five failures from the TCS are
identified to be PCI's. These are listed in Appendix D.
4.4 Analysis Results WRS
The Water Removal Subsystem consists of a condenser, hydrogen
pump-separator, water trap and water discharge line. These
components are illustrated in Figure 9. There were twenty-six
failure modes identified for the WRS division. Of these twenty-
six, nine are criticality 2/IR, four are criticality 3/IR,
four are criticality 3/2R, and nine are criticality 3/3. Twelve
failures from the WRS are identified to be PCI's. These are
listed in Appendix D.
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
AOA
ATO
CIL
CPM
CRIT
CSA
C&W
ECLSS
EPA
EPG
EPS
F'
FC
FCP
FMEA
FSSR
GFE
HW
IFC
IOA
MDAC
NASA
NSTS
NA
OMRSD
PCI
PRCB
PRSDS
PSA
RCS
RI
RTLS
SM
STS
TAL
TCS
UEA
WRS
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
M
m
Abort Once Around
Abort To Orbit
Critical Items List
Cell Performance Monitor
Criticality
Cell Stack Assembly
Caution and Warning System
Environmental Control and Life Support System
Environmental Protection Agency
Electrical Power Generation
Electrical Power System
Functional
Fuel Cell
Fuel Cell Powerplant
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
Flight System Software Requirement
Government, Furnished Equipment
Hardware
International Fuel Cells
Independent Orbiter Assessment
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Space Transportation System
Not Applicable
Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specification
Document
Potential Critical Item
Program Requirements Control Board
Power Reactant Storage & Distribution System
Power Section Assembly
Reactant Control Subsystem
Rockwell International
Return To Landing Site
System Management
Space Transportation System
Transatlantic Abort Landing
Thermal Control Subsystem
Unitized Electrode Assembly
Water Removal Subsystem
A-I

APPENDIX B
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B.I
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
iSubsystem-Specific Ground RUles and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(oPs)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.
B-2
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
B-3
APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions.
l ,
.
.
4.
,
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
B-4
.,
•
,
i0.
ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser•
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest•
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
EPG-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
l •
•
•
Component age life will not be considered in the analysis•
RATIONALE: Component age life analysis is beyond the
scope of this task.
Cryogenic system pressure to the fuel cell will be assumed
lost if unable to maintain minimum supply conditions of i00
PSI for H2 and/or 02 tanks.
RATIONALE: Minimum requirements definition. Flight
rule definition•
An 02 cryo tank will be assumed lost if both of its heaters
fail to function (i.e., neither heater will function with
the delta current sensors enabled)•
o
•
,
•
RATIONALE: Systems failure definition•
definition.
Flight rule
An H2 cryo tank will be assumed lost if neither of its
heaters will function•
RATIONALE: Systems failure definition.
definition•
Flight rule
An impending loss of all cryo 02 or all cryo H2 tanks will
be cause to exercise the highest-priority abort mode the
loss/leak will allow.
RATIONALE: Flight rule definition.
Continue nominal ascent if 2/3/4 02 (H2) tanks fail when
flying 3/4/5•
Enter next PLS daily go/no-go if two 02 (H2) tanks fail
during lift-off and on-orbit.
RATIONALE: Flight rules go/no-go criteria.
Ascent abort decision will be needed for any EPG/PRSD/FCP
problems that will not support four hours on-orbit plus
entry time.
RATIONALE: Flight operations rules•
B-6
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i0.
A fuel cell will be considered failed if the following
conditions exist.
a. An abnormal or unexplained voltage versus current
performance loss of >0.5 volts for a single FC based on
predicted performance data.
b. Coolant pump or H2 pump/H20 separator is lost.
c. Fuel cell stack-coolant temperature >255 degrees
(242.5) degrees F or <175 degrees (182.5) degrees F.
d Coolant pressure >75 (71.4) PSIA and increasing.
e. Fuel cell unable to discharge water to the ECLSS H20
storage tanks or overboard via the fuel cell H20
relief system.
f. Local KOH concentration >48 percent (45 percent) dry or
<24 percent (29 percent) wet as indicated by fuel cell
stack-coolant temperature, condenser exit temperature,
and current relationship.
g. Fuel cell reactant valve fails closed.
h. Cannot be connected to a main bus.
i. Fuel cell H20 pH high confirmed.
j. Fuel cell 02 reaction chambers cannot be purged.
k. Fuel cell end-cell heater failing on.
i. Fuel cell substack delta volts >150 millivolts and
increasing.
RATIONALE: Systems failure definition.
Loss of one fuel cell is considered cause for priority
flight and abort decision.
RATIONALE: Mission flight rule definition.
Loss of two fuel cells is considered cause for abort
mission.
RATIONALE: Contingency action summary. Flight Rule
definition.
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12.
13.
14,
15.
16.
Loss of three fuel cells is considered loss of life/vehicle
in all mission phases.
RATIONALE: Flight rule definition.
Loss of two fuel cells in the first stage of ascent is
considered loss of life/vehicle.
RATIONALE: SRB loads are too high for one fuel cell to
support, voltage may go <25v which will
shut down the GPCs.
Although the ECLSS product-water storage is a separate
system from EPG, it will be considered as a failable
redundant product-water relief line for purposes of the EPG
functional criticality scenarios.
RATIONALE: This assumption violates general ground
rule 3.1.1.6 but is essential for
evaluating failures associated with the
water relief line.
Filter failure will only be considered in the case of total
flow blockage. Cases of improper/insufficient filtering
will not be considered except where obvious.
RATIONALE: The effect of 'poor' filter performance on
downstream components is beyond the scope
of our efforts.
The start/sustaining heater on the left-hand FCP (FCP #1) is
assumed to be disconnected. Thus, this FCP cannot be
maintained operational at no-load, and will be considered
shutdown if the load cannot be maintained at greater than 2
KW.
RATIONALE: Load needed to maintain operating
temperature. Right hand FCP uses
sustaining heater to maintain temperature
at no-load.
For all "failed open" failure modes for valves which are
normally open, redundancy screen B will be assumed failed.
RATIONALE: The failure is not detectable until the valve
is required to be closed.
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17.
18.
Five 02 and H2 tanks are being used as the baseline
configuration under study.
RATIONALE: The configuration for all redundant components
is being considered for this analysis.
Inadvertant Fuel Cell shutdown during RTLS and TAL abort is
considered loss of crew/vehicle.
RATIONALE: Loss of FCP 1/Bus A is loss of OMS Engine
Purge Capability (required for TAL) and Aft
Compartment MPS Helium Purge Capability
(required for RTLS and TAL).
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of
these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed, and
parent assembly, as well as the function. For each failure mode,
the possible causes are outlined, and the assessed hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase is listed, as
described in the NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA
and CIL, I0 OCtober 1986. Finally, effects are entered at the
bottom of each sheet, and the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
C-I
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
i01 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL CELL
LOSS ELECTRICAL CONTACT IN THE POWER SECTION
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) PSA
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
MC464-0115
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, THERMAL STRESS,
FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ELECTRICAL CONTACT CAUSES INADVERTANT FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-2
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 104 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/ZR
2/ZR
ITEM: END CELL HEATER
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) PSA
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC464-0115
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FUEL CELL THERMAL INSULATION IS CAUSED BY THE FAILED OFF
END CELL HEATERS. DURING LIGHT ELECTRICAL LOADING OF THE FUEL
CELL, THE LOSS OF THE FUEL CELL HEATER MAY CAUSE CELL FLOODING
WHICH REQUIRES FCP SHUTDOWN. ELECTRICAL END CELL HEATERS ARE
BEING REPLACED WITH HEATERS CONTROLLED BY THE COOLANT SYSTEM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-5
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 105 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
END CELL HEATER
FAIL ON
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) PSA
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
MC464-0115
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL FAILURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ON ORBIT THE FUEL CELL WOULD HAVE TO BE SHUTDOWN WITH A FAILED ON
END CELL HEATER. EXCESSIVE HEATING WILL DEGRADE CELL MATRIX OR
SEALS AND ALLOW REACTANT CROSSOVER.
WITH THE END CELL HEATERS FAILED ON THE FUEL CELL CAN OPERATE FOR
51 MINUTES BEFORE THE CELLHAS TO BE SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCEs:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-6
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
106 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SEPARATOR PLATES/UEA
REACTANT LEAKAGE TO ORBITER (EXTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EPG
2) FCP
3) PSA
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: I/I
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC464-0115
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN EXTERNAL REACTANT LEAK IN THE SEPARATOR PLATES CAN CAUSE A
POTENTIAL EXPLOSION/FIRE. THE LEAKAGE IS DETECTABLE WITH HIGH
REACTANT FLOW RATES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 107 ABORT:
HDW/  u-NC
1/1
1/1
ITEM: SEPARATOR PLATES/UEA
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) PSA
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC464-0115
CAUSES: DEFECT IN ELECTROLYTE MATIRX; DEFECT IN SEAL/SEPARATOR
PLATE; EXCESSIVE REACTANT PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REACTANT CROSSOVER WITHIN THE SEPARATOR PLATES CAN CAUSE
POTENTIAL EXPLOSION/FIRE HAZARD. THE REACTANT CROSSOVER IS
DETECTABLE BY CELL PERFORMANCE MONITOR AND HIGH REACTANT FLOW
RATES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-8
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/85 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
108 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SEPARATOR PLATES
COOLANT LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) PSA
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC464-0115
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COOLANT LEAK WITHIN THE SEPARATOR PLATES WILL CONTAMINATE THE
ELECTROLYTE AND DEGRADE FCP PERFORMANCE. IT COULD ALSO CAUSE
LOSS OF TEMPERATURE CONTROL. EITHER CONDITION WILL REQUIRE FUEL
CELL SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-9
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
109 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SEPARATOR PLATES
REACTANT BLOCKAGE (02 INLET MANIFOLD)
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) PSA
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
MC464-0115
CAUSES: CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE OXYGEN INLET TO THE SEPARATOR PLATE IS BLOCKED, THEN HIGH
HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION FORCES ELECTROLYTE OUT OF THE CELL MATRIX
RESULTING IN PRODUCT WATER CONTAMINATION AND FCP DEGRADATION.
WATER CONTAMINATION IS GROUND RULE FOR FCP SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-10
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
ii0 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CELL PERFORMANCE MONITOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) PSA
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC464-0015
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO MONITOR CELL
PERFORMANCE AND CELL FAILURE. IF THE CPM IS LOST FOR ONE FUEL
CELL, THE AFFECTED CELL CAN BE BUS TIED FOR PERFORMANCE
MONITORING. IF ALL CPMIS ARE LOST, IT COULD BE CATASTROPHIC.
REACTANT CROSSOVER, WHICH COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION, WOULD BE
UNDETECTABLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-11
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
iii ABORT:
HDW/nmC
2/1R
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INTEGRATED DUAL GAS REGULATOR
GROSS VENTING
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) RCS
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
MC464-0115
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, FATIGUEp CORROSION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GROSS VENTING ALLOWS REACTANTS TO VENT THROUGH THE PURGE/VENT
LINE AT A FLOW RATE THAT PREVENTS REACTANT FLOW TO THE PSA. THIS
WOULD CAUSE INADVERTANT FCP SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-12
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 112 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: INTEGRATED DUAL GAS REGULATOR
FAILURE MODE: H20VERPRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) RCS
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC464-0115
CAUSES: MECANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HYDROGEN OVERPRESSURE WILL CAUSE ELETROLYTE DEPLETION, WATER
CONTAMINATION AND CELL SEAL FAILURE. HYDROGEN OVERPRESSURIZATION
WOULD BE CAUSE FOR FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
113 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
2/IR
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INTEGRATED DUAL GAS REGULATOR
H2 STARVATION
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) RCS
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
MC464-0115
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HYDROGEN STARVATION CAUSES INADVERTANT FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-14
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 114 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: INTEGRATED DUAL GAS REGULATOR
FAILURE MODE: 02 OVERPRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) RCS
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC464-0115
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OXYGEN OVERPRESSURIZATION WILL CAUSE SEAL FAILURE AND OXYGEN
LEAKAGE AND COOLANT OVERPRESSURE (THROUGH ACCUMULATOR). OXYGEN
OVERPRESSURIZATION WOULD BE CAUSE FOR FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 115 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
I/1
ITEM: INTEGRATED DUAL GAS REGULATOR
FAILURE MODE: 02 STARVATION
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) RCS
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
MC464-0115
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OXYGEN STARVATION WILL CAUSE ELECTROLYTE DEPLETION WATER
CONTAMINATION, AND SEAL FAILURE. REACTANT STARVATION CAUSES
INADVERTANT FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-16
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 116 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: INTEGRATED DUAL GAS REGULATOR
FAILURE MODE: PURGE FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) RCS
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORB IT: 2/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC464-0115
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PURGE FAILURE OF THE INTEGRATED DUAL GAS REGULATOR WILL DEGRADE
THE FUEL CELL PERFORMANCE. AN ADDITIONAL FAILURE RESULTING IN
THE NEED TO VENT WOULD CAUSE REACTANT OVERPRESSURE, WHICH
REQUIRES FCP SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: i/1
117 ABORT: i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2/02 LINES AND FITTINGS AND ACCESSORY COMPONENTS
REACTANT LEAKAGE TO THE ORBITER (EXTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) RCS
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
MC464-0115
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN EXTERNAL REACTANT LEAK AT THE COMPONENT CAN CAUSE A POTENTIAL
EXPLOSION/FIRE. THE LEAKAGE IS DETECTABLE BY HIGH REACTANT FLOW
RATES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-18
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 118 ABORT:
HDW/nmC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: O2/H2 PURGE-VENT LINES AND VENT NOZZLES
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) RCS
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
454211
MID-BODY
V070-454720-003,V070-454720-004, V070-454210, V070-
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FREEZING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTED FLOW WITHIN THE VENT LINES AND NOZZLES PREVENTS THE
PURGE OF THE FUEL CELL POWERPLANTS (FCP). THE INABILITY TO PURGE
FCPIS WILL DEGRADE THEIR PERFORMANCE. AN ADDITIONAL FAILURE
RESULTING IN THE NEED TO VENT COULD BE CATASTROPHIC.
THIS WOULD CAUSE REACTANT OVERPRESSURE. THIS FAILURE WOULD BE
DETECTED DURING PURGE ATTEMPTS AND BY H2/O2 FLOWS AND PURGE LINE
TEMPERATURE SENSORS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
119 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 PURGE LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR
OPEN OR SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) RCS
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: ME449-0160-0003
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILED TEMPERATURE SENSOR PREVENTS THE AUTO PURGE SEQUENCE BY
INDICATING A CONSTANT LOW SCALE TEMPERATURE. MANUAL PURGE CAN BE
PERFORMED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-20
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
120 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 PURGE LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR
OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) RCS
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
ME449-0160-0003
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE SENSOR INDICATES A HIGH TEMPERATURE, THEN THE PURGE VALVE
COULD OPEN BEFORE THE OXYGEN LINE IS HEATED. THEREFORE, THE LINE
COULD FREEZE WHICH COULD PREVENT PURGING. THE LOSS OF PURGING
COULD CAUSE DEGRADED FUEL CELL PERFORMANCE. USE OF MANUAL
HEATERS WOULD ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-21
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 121 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: H2 PURGE LINE TEMPERATURE SENSORS 1 & 2
FAILURE MODE: OPEN OR SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) RCS
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: ME449-0160-003
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILED TEMPERATURE SENSOR PREVENTS THE AUTO PURGE SEQUENCE BY
INDICATING A CONSTANT LOW SCALE TEMPERATURE. MANUAL PURGE CAN BE
PERFORMED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-22
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 122 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: H2 PURGE LINE TEMP. SENSORS 1 & 2
FAILURE MODE: OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) RCS
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
ME449-0160-003
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE SENSOR INDICATES A HIGH TEMPERTURE, THEN THE PURGE VALVE
COULD OPEN BEFORE THE LINE IS HEATED. THIS COULD CAUSE THE LINE
TO FREEZE. A FROZEN LINE COULD PREVENT A PURGE WHICH WOULD CAUSE
PERFORMANCE OF THE FUEL CELL TO BE DEGRADED. USE OF MANUAL
HEATERS WOULD ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-23
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
123 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 PURGE LINE HEATERS (6)
FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) RCS
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC363-0038-0001, -0004
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, HUMIDITY, SWITCH FAILURE, SHORT
CIRCUIT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THE GPC HEATER CIRCUITS HAS NO EFFECT ON THE
SYSTEM BECAUSE OF REDUNDANT HEATER CIRCUITS. IF BOTH HEATER
CIRCUITS FAILED, THE LINE COULD FREEZE AND PURGE CAPABILITY WOULD
BE LOST. A FAILURE RESULTING IN THE NEED TO VENT COULD CAUSE
OVERPRESSURI ZATION.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-24
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 124 ABORT:
ITEM: 02 PURGE LINE HEATERS (6)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) RCS
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC363-0038-0001, -0004
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, HUMIDITY, SWITCH FAILURE, SHORT
CIRCUIT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILED ON HEATER HAS NO MAJOR EFFECT ON THE FUEL CELL.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-25
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/IR
125 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 PURGE LINE HEATERS (6) AND NOZZLE HEATERS (2)
FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) RCS
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC363-0038-0003, -0004
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, HUMIDITY, SWITCH FAILURE, SHORT
CIRCUIT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THE GPC HEATER CIRCUITS HAS NO EFFECT ON THE FUEL
CELL BECAUSE OF REDUNDANT HEATERS. IF BOTH HEATER CIRCUITS FAIL,
THE LINE COULD FREEZE AND PURGE CAPABILITY WOULD BE LOST.
A FAILURE RESULTING IN THE NEED TO VENT COULD CAUSE
OVERPRESSURIZATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-26
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
126 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 PURGE LINE HEATERS (6) AND NOZZLE HEATERS (2)
FAIL ON
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) RCS
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC363-0038-0003, -0004
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, HUMIDITY, SWITCH FAILURE, SHORT
CIRCUIT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILED ON HEATER HAS NO MAJOR EFFECT ON THE FUEL CELL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-27
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
127 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
311R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02/H2 FLOWMETER
ZERO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) RCS
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC464-0115
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELETRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF A FLOWMETER MALFUNCTIONS, THEN LEAKING REACTANT WOULD BE
UNDETECTABLE WHICH COULD POSSIBLY BE CATASTROPHIC.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-28
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
128 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
START-UP HEATER
FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) TCS
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC464-0115
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE START/SUSTAINING HEATERS HAVE BEEN DISCONNECTED ON FCPI.
FUEL CELL START-UP PROCESS WOULD TAKE LONGER AND WOULD POSSIBLY
HAVE DEGRADED FUEL CELL PERFORMANCE DUE TO LOSS OF SUSTAINING
HEATER THAT MAINTAINS COOLANT TEMPERATURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-29
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
129 ABORT:
HDW/nmC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
START-UP HEATER
FAIL ON
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) TCS
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
MC464-0115
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE HEATER FAILS ON, THE FUEL CELL WOULD OVERHEAT WHICH COULD
CAUSE EXCESSIVE KOH RELEASE AND ELECTROLYTE DRYOUT. ELECTROLYTE
DRYOUT CAN LEAD TO CROSSOVER AND REQUIRES FCP SHUTDOWN. THE HEAT
COULD CAUSE COOLANT TO DRYOUT OR CHAR. THIS COULD POSSIBLY LEAD
TO COOLANT PUMP FAILURE DUE TO PLUGGING FROM COOLANT CHARRING BY-
PRODUCT. THIS WOULD ALSO REQUIRE FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-30
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
130 ABORT:
HDWlFUNC
2/1R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2/02 PREHEATER
RESTRICTED COOLANT FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) TCS
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
MC464-0115
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF COOLANT FLOW TO THE FCP WOULD REQUIRE THE FUEL CELL TO BE
SHUTDOWN. THIS WOULD BE DETECTED BY THE COOLANT DELTA PRESSURE
SWITCH.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-31
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 131 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: H2/02 PREHEATER,PUMP, THERMALCONTROLVALVE,
CONDENSER, FILTERS, START/SUSTAIN HEATER, ACCUMULATOR, FLEXIBLE
INTERFACES, ECLSS HEAT EXCHANGERS
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK OF TCS COOLANT
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) TCS
S) '
6)
v)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC464-0115
CAUSES : VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE CAUSES A DECREASE IN COOLANT PRESSURE OF THE
SYSTEM AND LOSS OF COOLANT FLOW TO THE FCP. THIS IS DETECTABLE
BY THE COOLANT DELTA PRESSURE SWITCH. LOSS OF COOLANT WILL CAUSE
FCP OVERHEATING AND POSSIBLE REACTANT CROSSOVER. THIS
REQUIRES FCP SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-32
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
132 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COOLANT PUMP
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) TCS
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
MC464-0115
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COOLANT PUMP FAILURE WILL RESULT IN FCP OVERHEATING DUE TO
INSUFFICIENT COOLANT FLOW. THIS MAY RESULT IN ELECTROLYTE DRYOUT
WHICH COULD CAUSE REACTANT CROSSOVER. THIS REQUIRES FCP
SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-33
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 133 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: COOLANT PRESSURE SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) TCS
s)
6)
v)
8)
s)
SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
MC464-0115
CAUSES: PIECE PART FAILURE, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PRESSURE TAB WILL NOT GO GRAY WHEN FUEL CELL START-UP IS
PERFORMED OR IT WILL GO TO BARBER POLE, IF THE FCP IS ALREADY
RUNNING. RELAY K9 WILL NOT CLOSE, WHICH WILL PREVENT START-UP
HEATER FROM ACTIVATING AND THE FLOW CONTROL BY-PASS VALVE
FROM ACTIVATING. IF START BUTTON IS RELEASED THE FUEL CELL WILL
DO AN AUTOMATIC SHUTDOWN. NOTE: FUEL CELL CAN STILL BE STARTED
IF THE START BUTTON IS HELD DOWN FOR AT LEAST 32 SECONDS. THIS
ALLOWS ENOUGH TIME FOR THE TIMER MODULE TO CLOSE RELAY KI0.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-34
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 134 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: STACK INLET TEMPERATURE SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: FULL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) TCS
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC464-0115
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DETECTS STACK INLET TEMPERATURE USED BY START-UP HEATER
ELECTRONICS. FAILURE HIGH WOULD PREVENT HEATER OPERATION WHICH
WOULD SLOW THE START-UP PROCESS. NOTE THAT THE START-UP HEATER
IS DISCONNECTED ON FCP#1.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-35
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
135 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
STACK INLET TEMPERATURE SENSOR
LOW OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) TCS
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC464-0115
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MEASURES THE TEMPERATURE OF COOLANT ENTERING STACK USED BY THE
START-UP HEATER ELECTRONICS. FAILURE LOW WOULD LOSE ONE PATH FOR
START-UP HEATER SHUTDOWN. REMAINING PATH IS STACK OUTLET
TEMPERATURE SENSORAND ELECTRONICS AND MANUAL SWITCHES.
FAILURE OF REDUNDANT PATHS COULD CAUSE START-UP HEATER TO FAIL ON
WHICH COULD REQUIRE FCP SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-36
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 136 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
STACK OUTLET TEMPERATURE SENSOR
FULL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) TCS
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC464-0115
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MEASURES THE TEMPERATURE OF COOLANT EXITINGTHE STACK WHICH IS
USED BY THE START-UP/SUSTAINING HEATER ELETRONICS. FAILURE HIGH
COULD PREVENT START-UP OR SUSTAINING HEATER OPERATION. START-UP
HEATER FAILURE COULD SLOW THE FCP START-UP PROCESS.
SUSTAINING HEATER FAILURE COULD DEGRADE THE FCP PERFORMANCE.
NOTE: START-UP HEATER IS DISCONNECTED ON FCP#1.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-37
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 137 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: STACK OUTLET TEMPERATURE SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: LOW OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) TCS
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC464-0115
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MEASURES THE TEMPERATURE OF THE COOLANT EXITINGTHE STACK WHICH
IS USED BY THE START-UP/SUSTAINING HEATER ELECTRONICS. SENSOR
FAILURE LOW COULD PREVENT START-UP OR SUSTAINING HEATER SHUTDOWN.
THIS WOULD REQUIRE FCP SHUTDOWN. NOTE: START-UP HEATER IS
DISCONNECTED ON FCP#1.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-38
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 138 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
2/1R
211R
ITEM: WATER SEPARATOR PUMP
FAILURE MODE: DEGRADED PERFORMANCE
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3 ) ASA
4) WRS
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
MC464-0115
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, STRUCTURAL PART FAILURE, ELECTRICAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILED OFF OR DEGRADED PERFORMANCE WATER SEPARATOR PUMP WILL
FLOOD A FUEL CELL. THIS RESULTS IN DECREASED ELECTROLYTE
CONCENTRATION AND REQUIRES FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN. AN ERRATIC PUMP
MOTOR IS DETECTABLE BY ITS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT MEASUREMENTS,
BECAUSE OF LIQUID GETTING INTO THE PUMP. A MOTOR FAILURE IS ALSO
DETECTABLE BY A PH MEASUREMENT AND HIGH CONDENSER OUTLET
TEMPERATURE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-39
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 139 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
i/I
ITEM: WATER SEPARATOR PUMP/WATER CONDENSATE TRAP
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) WRS
S)
e)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
MC464-0115
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTED HYDROGEN FLOW FROM THE WATER SEPARATOR PUMP CAUSES
REACTANT STARVATION AND INADVERTANT FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN. LOSS OF
A SINGLE FUEL CELL REQUIRES PRIORITY MISSIONAND/OR ABORT
DECISION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-40
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
141 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/ZR
2/ZR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMAL CONTROL VALVE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) TCS
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC464-0115
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: FATIGUE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE, BINDING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT COULD CAUSE ELECTROLYTE DRY OUT. THE CONDENSER
WOULD CONDENSE TOO MUCH WATER. THIS CONDITION CAN LEAD TO
REACTANT CROSSOVER AND EXPLOSION. IF THE REVERSE FAILURE OCCURS,
FUEL CELL FLOODING COULD OCCUR.
COOLANT TEMPERATURE WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT FOR CONDENSING WATER.
EITHER FAILURE REQUIRES FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/04/86 C-42
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 142 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: WATER DISCHARGE VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) WRS
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
MC464-0115
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
A FAILED CLOSED WATER DISCHARGE VALVE WILL CAUSE FUEL CELL
FLOODING FROM WATER BUILD UP. FLOODING OF THE FUEL CELL REQUIRES
SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-43
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 143 ABORT:
ITEM: H20 DISCHARGELINE
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTEDFLOW
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) WRS
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC363-0038-0006
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, FROZEN WATER
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTED FLOW CAUSES FUEL CELL FLOODING AND SHUTDOWN.
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-44
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 144 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PH WATER SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) WRS
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC464-0115
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE PH SENSOR FAILS TO WORK, THE PH CAN BE TESTED MANUALLY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-45
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
145 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRODUCT WATER LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) WRS
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: ME449-0160-003
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILED TEMPERATURE SENSOR CAUSES LOSS OF MEASUREMENT. A FAILED
TEMPERATURE SENSOR CAN BE DETECTED BY SWITCHING TO THE STANDBY
HEATERS AND CHECKING THE MEASUREMENT TO SEE IF IT STABILIZES. IF
THE MEASUREMENT STABILIZES, THIS WOULD INDICATE THAT A FAILED
HEATER WAS CAUSING THE PROBLEM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-46
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
146 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRODUCT WATER LINE HEATER (A&B)
FAILED ON
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) WRS
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC363-0038-0006
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILED ON LINE HEATERS HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE CREW OR MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-47
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
147 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRODUCT WATER LINE HEATER (A&B)
FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) FCP
3 ) ASA
4) WRS
S)
6)
V)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONOREIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
MC363-0038-0006
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PRODUCT WATER LINE HEATERS ARE USED DURING START-UP. DURING
NORMAL MISSIONS, THE HEATERS ARE NOT INITIATED, NOR IS THE FUEL
CELL STOPPED AND RESTARTED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-48
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 148 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRODUCT WATER LINE
RESTRICTED FLOW (EXTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) FCP
3 ) ASA
4) WRS
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
VO70-454110-124
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FROZEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTED FLOW WITHIN THE PRODUCT WATER LINE WOULD RESULT IN NO
PRODUCT WATER TO THE ECLSS. IF THE WATER RELIEF LINE ALSO
BECOMES BLOCKED, THEN ALL OF THE FUEL CELLS WOULD FLOOD. THIS
MEANS YOU ARE ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-49
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 149 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
312R
312R
ITEM: WATER SUPPLY CHECK VALVE
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) WRS
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ F ]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: ME284-0475-0001
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
AN EXTERNAL LEAK AT THE WATER SUPPLY CHECK VALVE CAUSES LOSS OF
PRODUCT WATER FROM THE FUEL CELL TO THE ECLSS. LOSS OF ALL
PRODUCT WATER MEANS MISSION TERMINATION DUE TO INSUFFICIENT
POTABLE WATER. LEAKAGE OF THE CHECK VALVE IN THE WATER RELIEF
PANEL ASSEMBLY CAN CAUSE FREEZING OF ALL FUEL CELL WATER LINES.
THIS WOULD RESULT IN FLOODING OF ALL FUEL CELLS.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-50
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
150 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER SUPPLY CHECK VALVE
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) WRS
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
ME284-0475-0001
CAUSES : VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE CHECK VALVE WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL UNLESS THE
RELIEF VALVE ALSO FAILED CLOSED. THIS WOULD CAUSE THE FUEL CELL
TO OVERPRESSURE AND FLOOD.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-51
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
151 ABORT:
HDW/nmc
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER SUPPLY CHECK VALVE
FAILS TO CHECK
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) WRS
S)
6)
V)
S)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
ME284-0475-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FROZEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE CHECK VALVE TO CHECK PROPERLY MAY ALLOW ALL
FUEL CELLS TO VENT WATER THROUGH A SINGLE WATER RELIEF VALVE.
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD BE A WATER RELIEF VALVE FAILED OPEN. THE
SECOND FAILURE WOULD BE THE CHECK VALVE FOR THE SAME FUEL CELL
FAILING TO CHECK. THIS COULD CAUSEMISSION TERMINATION DUE TO
LOSS OF ALL POTABLE WATER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-52
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
152 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
312R
312R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER RELIEF VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) WRS
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
MC284-0431-0001
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN EXTERNAL LEAK AT THE WATER RELIEF VALVE CAUSES LOSS OF PRODUCT
WATER FROM THE FUEL CELL TO THE ECLSS. LOSS OF ALL PRODUCT WATER
MEANS MISSION TERMINATION DUE TO INSUFFICIENT POTABLE WATER.
LEAKAGE OF THE RELIEF VALVE IN THE WATERRELIEF PANEL ASSEMBLY
CAN CAUSE FREEZING OF ALL FUEL CELL WATER LINES. THIS WOULD
RESULT IN FLOODING OF ALL FUEL CELLS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-53
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
I
MDAC ID: 153 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM: WATER RELIEF VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) WRS
S)
7)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC284-0431-0001
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILED OPEN WATER RELIEF VALVE CAUSES LOSS OF THE PRODUCT WATER
FROM THE ONE FUEL CELL TO THE ECLSS. LOSS OF ALL PRODUCT WATER
COULD OCCUR WITH A SECOND FAILURE: THE WATERRELIEF CHECK VALVE
STUCK OPEN (FAILS TO CHECK) COULD ALLOW ALL PRODUCT WATER
FROM ALL FCP'S TO VENT THROUGH THE SINGLE OPEN VALVE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-54
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 154 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: WATER RELIEF VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) WRS
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
MC284-0431-0001
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION , ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF RELIEF VALVE CAUSES NO MAJOR IMPACT, BUT IF A BLOCKAGE
OCCURS WITHIN THE ECLSS PRODUCT WATER LINE, THEN FUEL CELL WOULD
FLOOD WHICH IS A GROUND RULE FOR FCP SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-55
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
155 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER RELIEF VALVE HEATER (A&B)
FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) WRS
S)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
MC363-0038-0014
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILED OFF HEATERS COULD CAUSE WATER TO FREEZE IN VALVE AND BLOCK
THE RELIEF LINE. THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF A FCP, IF THE
WATER NEEDS TO BE VENTED. REDUNDANT HEATERS MUST FAIL FOR THIS
TO OCCUR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-56
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 156 ABORT:
ITEM: WATER RELIEF VALVE HEATER A&B
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) WRS
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC363-0038-0014
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILED ON HEATERS HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE FUEL CELL OR
MISSION/CREW.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-57
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
157 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER RELIEF VALVE TEMPERATURE SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) WRS
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
ME449-0160-0003
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILED TEMPERATURE SENSOR CAUSES LOSS OF MEASUREMENT. A FAILED
TEMPERATURE SENSOR CAN BE DETECTED BY SWITCHING TO THE STANDBY
HEATERS AND CHECKING THE MEASUREMENT TO SEE IF IT STABILIZES.
IF THE MEASUREMENT STABILIZES, THIS WOULD INDICATE THAT A FAILED
HEATER WAS CAUSING THE PROBLEM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-58
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 158 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/3
313
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER RELIEF LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) WRS
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
ME449-0160-0003
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILED TEMPERATURE SENSOR IS LOSS OF MEASUREMENT ONLY. (THE
LINE HEATERS ARE CONTROLLED BY THERMOSTATS.) INSTRUMENT LOSS
CAN BE CHECKED BY SWITCHING TO A REDUNDANT HEATER TO SEE IF THAT
STABILIZES THE LINE TEMPERATURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-S9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
159 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/ZR
2/ZR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER RELIEF (VENT) LINE
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) WRS
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
V070-454110
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FREEZE-UP
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTED FLOW WITHIN THE WATER RELIEF (VENT) LINE WOULD LOSE
THE RELIEF FUNCTION FOR ALL CELLS. ADDITIONALLY, IF THE PRODUCT
WATER LINE PLUGGED UP, THEN ALL THE FUEL CELLS WOULD FLOOD.
THUS, WITH THE WATER RELIEF LINE PLUGGED, THERE IS ONLY ONE PATH
(PRODUCT WATER LINE) REMAINING BEFORE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-60
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/IR
160 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER VENT LINE HEATER A&BAND BARREL HEATER A&B
FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) FcP
3) ASA
4) WRS
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: MC363-0038-0014
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST HEATER LOSS HAS NO EFFECT ON THE WATER VENT LINE
BECAUSE OF REDUNDANT HEATERS. THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT HEATERS MAY
CAUSE THE VENT LINE TO FREEZE. THIS FAILURE WOULD NOT BE A
PROBLEM UNLESS THE ECLSS LINE IS ALSO BLOCKED, WHICH CAN CAUSE
FUEL CELL FLOODING.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-61
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 161 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: WATER VENT LINE HEATER A&BAND BARREL HEATER A&B
FAILURE MODE: FAILED ON
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) FCP
3 ) ASA
4) WRS
S)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
MC363-0038-0014
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILED ON HEATERS HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE CREW OR MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-62
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 162 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: WATER NOZZLE HEATER (A&B)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) WRS
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
ME363-0042-0003
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOZZLE HEATER A IS DISCONNECTED, THEREFORE, THE HEATER ELEMENT IS
NOT REDUNDANT. A FAILED ON NOZZLE HEATER HAS NO EFFECT ON THE
FUEL CELL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-63
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 163 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: WATER NOZZLE HEATER (A&B)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) WRS
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
ME363-0042-0003
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THEWATER IN THE NOZZLE FREEZES, THE WATER RELIEF FUNCTION IS
LOST. ADDITIONALLY, IF THE PRODUCT WATER LINE IS BLOCKED, ALL
THE FUEL CELLS WILL FLOOD. NOZZLE HEATER A IS DISCONNECTED;
THEREFORE, THE HEATER ELEMENT IS NOT REDUNDANT. HOWEVER, FOR THE
NEXT FLIGHT THE HEATER WILL BE FUNCTIONAL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-64
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 164 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: WATER RELIEF NOZZLE TEMPERATURE SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) WRS
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: ° 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: MID-BODY
PART NUMBER: K-SS4-U-TI-6CNX
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FROM THE WATER RELIEF NOZZLE TEMPERATURE
SENSOR COULD PREVENT THE NOZZLE HEATER FROM WORKING. IF THE
HEATER IS NONFUNCTIONAL, THE NOZZLE WOULD FREEZE. IF THE PRODUCT
WATER LINE IS BLOCKED, ALL THE FUEL CELLS WILL FLOOD.
WITH THE RELIEF NOZZLE BLOCKED, ONLY ONE PATH (PRODUCT WATER
LINE) REMAINS OPEN BEFORE LOSS OF ALL FCP'S.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-65
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
165 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER NOZZLE
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) FCP
3) ASA
4) WRS
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID-BODY
ME363-0042-0003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE WATER NOZZLE BECOMES BLOCKED, THE WATER RELIEF FUNCTION IS
LOST. WITH THE WATER NOZZLE BLOCKED, ONLY THE WATER LINE REMAINS
OPERATIONAL BEFORE LOSS OF ALL FCP'S DUE TO FLOODING.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/24/86 C-66
APENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
MDAC-ID
101
104
105
106
107
108
109
iii
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
129
130
131
132
138
139
141
142
143
148
149
151
152
ITEM FAILURE MODE
Fuel Cell
End Cell Heater
End Cell Heater
Separator Plates/UEA
Separator Plates/UEA
Separator Plates
Separator Plates
Integrated Dual Gas
Regulator
Integrated Dual Gas
Regulator
Integrated Dual Gas
Regulator
Integrated Dual Gas
Regulator
Integrated Dual Gas
Regulator
Integrated Dual Gas
Regulator
Loss electrical contact in
power section
Fail off
Fail on
Reactant leakage to Orbiter
(external leakage)
Internal leakage
Coolant leakage
Reactant Blockage
Gross Venting
H2 overpressure
H2 starvation
02 overpressure
02 starvation
Purge failure
H2/02 Lines and Fittings Reactant leakage to Orbiter
and Accessory Components (external leakage)
02/H2 Purge-Vent Lines
and Vent Nozzles Restricted flow
Start-Up Heater Fail on
H2/02 preheater Restricted coolant flow
H2/02 Preheater, Pump,
Thermal Control Valve,
Condenser, Filters,
Start/Sustain Heater,
Accumulator, Flexible
Interface, ECLSS Heat
Exchanger
Coolant Pump
Water Separator Pump
Water Separator Pump/
Water Condensate Trap Restricted flow
Thermal Control Valve Erroneous Output
Water Discharge Valve Fail closed
H20 Discharge Restricted flow
Product Water Line Restricted flow
Water Supply Check Valve External leakage
Water Supply Check Valve Fails to check
Water Relief Valve External leakage
External leak of TCS coolant
Loss of output
Degraded performance
D-I
MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
159
163
164
165
Water Relief (Vent)
Line
Water Nozzle Heater
(A&B)
Water Relief Nozzle
Temperature Output
Water Nozzle
Restricted flow
Fail off
Erroneous output
Restricted flow
D-2
